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Abstract
We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on
behavior in Tullock contests. We report on a series of two-player Tullock contest
experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural West
Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the degree of
religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Our main finding is that
the effect of social identity is small and inconsistent across the two religious groups in
our study. While we find small but statistically significant results in line with our
hypotheses in the Hindu sample, we find no statistically significant effects in the
Muslim sample. This is in contrast to evidence from Chakravarty et al. (2016), who
report significant differences in cooperation levels in prisoners’ dilemma and stag hunt
games, both in terms of village composition and identity. We attribute this to the fact
that social identity may have a more powerful effect on cooperation than on conflict.
1 Introduction 1
We often observe agents competing with each other to receive or get access to resources 2
in a wide variety of economic and social situations. Examples of such contests include 3
political competition, lobbying, or violent conflict. Resources spent in these contests are 4
not often recoverable and have little social value. While competition between such 5
groups can be resolved through the ballot box, often we also find such competition 6
ending up in violence and civil wars [1, 2]. Given the loss of welfare, understanding the 7
cause of such conflict can reduce the likelihood of conflicts. 8
Civil conflicts often occur between social and/or ethnic groups that compete for 9
limited resources. A possible motivation for these social or ethnic groups to enter into 10
socially expensive contests is that there are strong identities through which groups have 11
ethnic preferences. These ethnic preferences can cause ethnic groups to restrict goods 12
and services to members of their own ethnicity and deny them to other ethnic groups, 13
thus resulting in conflicts. Social scientists have documented and analyzed such 14
competition among social groups [3, 4]. 15
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A significant number of quantitative studies [5, 6] focus on aggregate cross-country 16
analysis in order to explain violence. These cross-national studies find that the 17
likelihood of wars and armed disputes among social groups increase with poverty and 18
with weak institutions. More recently, there have been studies of competition and group 19
violence using national-level data. Support for the increased competition for limited 20
resources is found by Urdal [7] who shows that scarcity of productive resources and 21
urban inequality increase the risk of armed conflict. Similarly, Mitra and Ray [4] also 22
find that the improvement of economic status of a minority group can be perceived by 23
the majority group as a threat, and can be a catalyst for conflict. 24
In this paper, we analyse to what extent social identity motivations can explain 25
conflict at the individual level. It is well understood that social identity influences 26
economic decisions [8, 9]. People’s preference for their own social group and or their 27
bias against other social groups could lead greater competition and increased likelihood 28
for conflict. 29
To this effect, we investigate what impact (if any) religious identities have on the 30
likelihood of conflict over a resource using a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in 31
West Bengal, India. We study the effect of religious identity by comparing the behavior 32
of Hindu and Muslim subjects when they play with their fellow in-group members to 33
the case where they play with the out-group, i.e. someone belonging to a different 34
religion. We furthermore study the effect of fragmentation on the likelihood of conflict 35
by running experiments in villages where the overwhelming majority of the population 36
is of one religion, as well as in villages where the population is roughly equally divided 37
along religious lines. 38
Any individual likely identifies himself or herself with various identities: race, 39
political affiliation, sexual orientation or religion shape our beliefs and actions [10, 11, 40
12]. Social groups formed from common links in race, religion and language can be more 41
broadly classified as ethnic groups [13]. Here, we focus on one aspect of ethnicity: 42
religion. In India, religion has a prominent position in society and it plays an important 43
role in defining an individual’s identity. According to the Census of India 2001, 44
Hinduism and Islam account for about 94% of India’s population (81% being Hindu and 45
13% Muslim). These religious groups have competed, often violently, in the past for 46
resources, and continue to do so at present. This highlights the role religious identity 47
could play in social and political spheres. 48
West Bengal, India, where we conduct our study, has witnessed several episodes of 49
severe violence between these two religious groups. Bengal as a state has been 50
partitioned twice along Hindu-Muslim lines: once by the British empire in 1905 and, on 51
the occasion of independence, in 1947 when India and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 52
were created. On both occasions there were mass displacements of people from one side 53
of the newly created border to the other and widely documented inter-religious violence 54
[14, 15]. Religious violence is still observed today, both in Bengal [16] and elsewhere [17]. 55
The continuing violence and competition among the religious groups suggest that 56
religious identity potentially plays a crucial role, especially in contexts where individuals 57
perceive competition or threat for resources from members belonging to other religious 58
groups. Some scholars argue that this competitive relationship between Muslims and 59
Hindus stems from the historical power structure of the two groups. While most of the 60
last millennium India’s political rulers belonged to the Muslim religion, up to 200 years 61
prior to independence and since then, Muslims ceased to be the governing class [18]. 62
In order to understand the effect of identity and social fragmentation on conflict and 63
competition, we study the Tullock contest [19, 20]. In this game, each competing party 64
can spend part of its wealth to increase the probability of obtaining a resource. However, 65
expenditures are sunk and therefore non-recoverable to both winning and losing parties 66
(see [21, 22] for reviews on the economics of conflict and contests, respectively). 67
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0 20 40 60 80
0 40, 40 0, 60 0, 40 0, 20 0, 0
20 60, 0 20, 20 7, 13 0, 0 -4, -16
40 40, 0 13, 7 0, 0 -8, -12 -13, -27
60 20, 0 0, 0 -12, -8 -20, -20 -26, -34
80 0, 0 -16, -4 -27, -13 -34, -26 -40, -40
Table 1. Expected payoffs for our implementation of the Tullock contest
There is a vast experimental literature on behavior in contests in experiments, 68
recently reviewed by Dechenaux et al. [23]. The main finding from the literature on 69
Tullock contest experiments is that subjects consistently bid above the risk neutral 70
Nash equilibrium. In the overwhelming majority of the experiments done to date, 71
individuals play the game in the absence of social context. While some experimental 72
work has been done in the context of groups [24, 25, 26], these experiments study how 73
individual effort provision changes when competition is done via groups. The fact that 74
group effort is the sum of individual group members’ efforts introduces a public good 75
problem, as there is the incentive to free ride on teammates. 76
Chowdhury et al. [27] study the role of identity in a three-player group Tullock 77
contest in the lab. They consider artificial identities in the spirit of the minimal group 78
paradigm, as well as real ethnic identities (South East Asian and Caucasian). The 79
authors find that group expenditures in their control treatment are in excess of the risk 80
neutral Nash equilibrium. However, unlike artificial identities, making ethnic identities 81
salient leads to significant increases in effort. 82
Our paper contributes to this literature by considering the effect of group identity on 83
behavior in single-player Tullock contests. We also study the effect of social 84
fragmentation on behavior by postulating a saliency channel: religious identity should 85
be more salient in fragmented villages and therefore, expenditure levels should be 86
higher. Our main finding is that the effect of social identity is small and inconsistent 87
across the two religious groups in our study. While we find statistically significant 88
results in line with our hypotheses in the Hindu sample, the effect sizes are small. We 89
find no statistically significant effects in the Muslim sample. 90
2 Experimental Design, Procedures and Hypotheses 91
2.1 The game 92
We implemented a simplified version of the Tullock contest. Subjects were endowed 93
with INR 80, which they could spend to obtain a prize equal to INR 80. We set the 94
prize value equal to the endowment to avoid the possibility of subjects incurring losses. 95
The expected value of the contest, Vi is given by Vi = 80 + 80pi − Ei, i = 1, 2, where 96
Ei ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60, 80} is the financial expenditure of player i. We opted for a reduced 97
action set to facilitate participants’ understanding of the game. The probability of 98
player i winning the contest is given by pi, which is equal to 1/2 if both players spend 99
zero and Ei/(Ei + Ej) if at least one player spends a positive amount. 100
The payoff matrix in Table 1 displays the expected payoffs denominated in Indian 101
Rupees (INR) in our experiment. The game was not displayed or explained to 102
participants in this manner. See the following section on the experimental procedures, 103
as well as the instructions and S1 Appendix for details. The unique Nash equilibrium of 104
the game is (20, 20), in which both players bid a quarter of the value of the prize, as in 105
the continuous version of the game. A somewhat unusual feature of our implementation 106
of the Tullock contest is the assumption that if neither player makes a positive 107
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Treatment
M-M H-H H-M MIX
Village Type
Homogenous - Muslim (94, 3) - - -
Fragmented (40, 1) (70, 2) (130, 4) (58, 2)
Homogenous - Hindu - (124, 4) - -
Note: (# of subjects, # of villages).
Table 2. Experimental design
expenditure, both players have an equal chance of obtaining the prize. Note also that 108
spending 40, 60 and 80 is strictly dominated by spending 20. Once we eliminate the 109
strictly dominated strategies, we obtain a game with the same properties as the 110
prisoners’ dilemma: the joint profit maximizing outcome is achieved when both players 111
spend zero on the contest, but it is in their individual best interest not to do so. This 112
does not have any implications on equilibrium behavior; behaviorally though, this could 113
lead to a decline in average effort levels as compared to the extant literature. 114
2.2 Experimental Design 115
The main purpose of the experiment is to understand how social identity preferences 116
interact with religious fragmentation to affect behavior in Tullock contests. To 117
understand the role of identity, we ran two treatments where subjects were playing with 118
their fellow in-group members: one where Hindus were paired to play with other Hindus 119
(H-H) with certainty, and another one where Muslims were paired with Muslims with 120
certainty (M-M). We also ran a treatment where subjects were matched with an 121
out-group: Hindus were paired with Muslims with certainty (H-M). Finally, we ran a 122
treatment where there was a 50% chance a participant would be matched with someone 123
of their own religion and a 50% he or she would be matched with someone of a different 124
religion, which we denote as MIX. It was not possible for us to design a treatment in 125
which identity was absent, since our experimental manipulation of religious identity 126
relies on the names of all participants in the session being common knowledge, as well 127
as the fact that subjects can observe the set of potential partners in the game. We 128
explain in detail how we implemented these treatments and how we induced group 129
identity in the subsection dedicated to experimental procedures below. 130
To understand the role of village-level fragmentation, we implemented M-M and H-H 131
treatments in two types of villages: one in which one group accounted for at least 90% 132
of the population, which we denote as homogeneous villages; and another type of village 133
in which each religious group accounted for about 50% of the population of the village, 134
which we denote as fragmented villages. Although the Indian Census collects 135
village-level data on religious composition, that information is classified and not 136
available to researchers. We use data from Das et al. [28] household survey in West 137
Bengal on religious discrimination to select villages. Table 2 outlines the different 138
treatments. 139
2.3 Hypotheses 140
To develop our hypotheses, we will rely upon the simplified version of the model of 141
other-regarding preferences proposed by [29], in which individuals exhibit disutility from 142
obtaining payoffs either higher or lower than others. [29] also include a parameter θ to 143
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capture reciprocity concerns. Since reciprocity concerns do not play a role in our 144
experiment, we exclude this parameter from the analysis. In a two-player setting, with 145
players i and j, the utility function for player i takes the following form: 146
ui(pij , pii) = (ρr + σs)pij + [1− (ρr + σs)]pii. (1)
The parameter ρ captures the extent to which player i cares about advantageous 147
inequality, since r = 1 if pij < pii and 0 otherwise; it is referred to by [30] as capturing 148
charity concerns. The parameter σ captures the extent to which player i cares about 149
disadvantageous inequality, since s = 1 if pij > pii and 0 otherwise. [30] refer to this 150
parameter as capturing envy. This formulation coincides with the model proposed by 151
[31] if σ < 0 < ρ < 1 ([29], p. 823), but it can also encompass spiteful/competitive 152
preferences if σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0. 153
Chen and Li [30] estimate the effect of group identity on other-regarding preferences 154
using artificial identities in the spirit of the minimal group paradigm developed by [10]. 155
Subjects were assigned to an artificial group and were asked to make a number of 156
decisions. In each decision, subjects had to choose between two income distributions, 157
whose recipients were (i) both in-group members, (ii) both out-group members, or (iii) 158
one was an in-group member and the other was an out-group member. Chen and Li 159
econometrically estimate ρ and σ conditional on the identity of the recipient. They find 160
subjects in their experiment exhibit greater charity concerns and lesser envy towards 161
in-group members than towards out-group members. In particular, their estimates are 162
such that ρI > ρO > 0 and σO < σI < 0, where the subscript I indicates in-group and 163
the subscript O denotes out-group. 164
We incorporate other-regarding preferences into the Tullock contest, this time using 165
the more general specification proposed by [29]. The best response in the Tullock game 166
by a player with Charness-Rabin preferences is given by: 167
BRi(Ej) = max
{
−Ej + [1− 2(ρr + σs)]
1− (ρr + σs)
√
80Ej [1− (ρr + σs)]
1− 2(ρr + σs) , 0
}
(2)
The symmetric equilibrium of this game is given by 168
E∗i =
20− 40(ρr + σs)
1− (ρr + σs) (3)
If we assume that individuals are inequality averse (i.e. σ < 0 < ρ < 1), as has been 169
found in the literature on other-regarding preferences to date, then similar to what [32] 170
has shown for Fehr-Schmidt preferences,
∂E∗i
∂σ > 0: an increase in “envy” concerns leads 171
to higher effort. Conversely, lower “envy” leads to lower effort. Also,
∂E∗i
∂ρ < 0: an 172
increase in “charity” concerns leads to lower equilibrium effort and vice versa. 173
Having established our theoretical framework, we now apply it to our experimental 174
design. We start by looking at the effect of identity preferences on behavior keeping 175
religious composition fixed – focusing on fragmented villages. Our model predicts that 176
there should be a relationship between the identity of the opponent in the Tullock 177
contest and rent-seeking expenditures. 178
Hypothesis 1: Expenditure levels in fragmented villages should increase in the 179
probability of being matched with an out-group member. 180
We now turn to the main hypothesis of the paper, which concerns the interaction 181
between social identity and fragmentation. [33] proposes a theory of optimal 182
distinctiveness, in which one’s affiliation to a group – and therefore our sense of identity 183
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– is affected by two competing needs. One one hand, we feel the need to belong to a 184
group. On the other hand, we feel the need to be distinct. The former drives isolated 185
individuals to seek membership of social groups, while the latter leads one to identify 186
more strongly with groups that emphasize one’s uniqueness. 187
This theory therefore postulates that the degree of saliency of a particular identity 188
will vary with how representative the members of the identity-relevant group are within 189
a society. In his book on identity and conflict, [11] reiterates this point, when he argues 190
that ”[T]he importance of a particular identity will depend on the social context.” 191
(p.25). Categories which provide a source of identity are naturally numerous, but Sen 192
argues that meaningful identities are a small subset of the set of categories. They may 193
become meaningful due to contextual specificity (i.e. national identity in the Olympics), 194
or due to common circumstances which yield feelings of mutual solidarity (i.e. a natural 195
disaster). Individuals consciously or unconsciously decide which identities they should 196
assign greater weight when making decisions on a regular basis. 197
The corollary of this argument is that in settings where one religious group is 198
predominant, individuals will put greater weight in other dimensions of their personal 199
identity, since the religious domain of their identity does not provide sufficient 200
distinctiveness, or is not sufficiently salient to provide the basis for meaningful 201
trade-offs. In other words, our participants’ sense of religious identity should be more 202
salient in villages where there is an out-group, as opposed to villages where all citizens 203
share the same religious beliefs. A stronger sense of religious identity in fragmented 204
villages therefore should imply that other-regarding preferences should be stronger in 205
fragmented villages than homogeneous villages: σIfrag < σ
I
homog and ρ
I
frag > ρ
I
homog. 206
This in turn, leads to our final hypothesis. 207
Hypothesis 2: Expenditure levels in H-H/M-M treatments should be lower in 208
fragmented villages than in homogeneous villages. 209
2.4 Participant Recruitment 210
We selected West Bengal to conduct our study for two reasons. Firstly, this Indian state 211
has historically witnessed several episodes of inter-religious tension. The partition on 212
Bengal along Hindu-Muslim lines in 1905 and the second partition of Bengal into West 213
Bengal and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1947, when the modern Indian state was 214
formed are particularly relevant to our study. In both cases, the mass displacements of 215
people led to numerous episodes of inter-religious violence [14, 15]. There are numerous 216
recorded incidents of violence between members of the two religious groups since the 217
1950s and the present day [4]. As recently as 2010, religious riots were recorded in West 218
Bengal [16]. 219
Secondly, our experimental design requires us to sample experimental participants 220
from (and conduct our sessions in) two types of villages: villages where one religious 221
group dominates, and villages whose population is roughly split along religious lines. 222
Unfortunately, although the Indian Census does collect information on citizens’ religious 223
affiliation, that data are not available to researchers at village level. Our sampling of 224
the villages was instead based on data from [28], who conducted a large-scale household 225
survey on religious fragmentation in West Bengal villages. Based on that survey, we 226
labeled villages where 90% or more of the population was from one religious group as 227
homogenous (they could be Homogenous-Muslim or Homogenous-Hindu), and villages 228
were labeled as fragmented if they had no more than 60% of the village population from 229
one group. Our choice of villages was further limited by the fact that we required a 230
room that was big enough to hold 20-30 participants at a time for a few hours. The 231
only such building in a village would be its primary school, which is where we 232
conducted our experiments. 233
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We employed a mixed-gender, mixed-religion team of local research assistants to 234
recruit participants and conduct the sessions, so as to minimize any possible 235
experimenter demand effect. A week ahead of a planned session, our research assistants 236
travelled to the village where that session would take place. A set of neighborhoods 237
were randomly selected, and within each neighborhood, recruitment was done on a 238
door-by-door basis. On a given street, every two consecutive houses were skipped and 239
the third house would be approached and those who agreed to participate would be 240
signed up. Participants were reminded about the session the day before it took place. 241
Participants did not know the purpose of the experiment: when approached, they were 242
informed that the research team would be conducting decision-making sessions. We 243
conducted one session per village. After the first session in the first village, it was clear 244
that participants discussed the experiments among their social network. Due to a 245
combination of the novelty factor and the generous incentive payments, the sessions 246
themselves raised interest among villagers in the hours after the sessions ended, 247
therefore contaminating the pool of potential participants in that village. 248
2.5 Experimental Procedures 249
We made religious identity salient by making the names of participants common 250
knowledge, and by allowing participants to visually identify their potential counterparts 251
in the games participants played. This is a combination of two existing methods of 252
making identity salient: [34] induce ethnic identity in experiments conducted in Uganda 253
using photographs of participants, while [35] induce ethnic identity in experiments 254
conducted in Israel using participants’ names. 255
Upon arrival to the school building where the session was to take place, participants 256
were asked to remain outside the main school building and wait for their name to be 257
called out. Upon hearing their name, each participant was taken to the main classroom, 258
and told to sit at one of the ends of the classroom, facing the middle. It is reasonably 259
easy to identify someone as a function of their name, since Muslim names originate from 260
Arabic, and are quite different from Hindu names. Calling in participants individually 261
made their religious identities salient (and established the existence of an out-group) in 262
an inconspicuous way. Eliciting religious identity through names could have also elicited 263
participants’ caste identity as well. We control for this possibility in the econometric 264
analysis of the data, and our results are robust. 265
Participants were told they would be making a series of decisions with someone on 266
the other side of the room, and they were told that they would always make each 267
decision with a different person. This allowed participants to identify the religious 268
identity of their potential counterparts, either through their choice of attire, or by 269
recognizing participants across the room. The experiments were unusual events in the 270
villages, and many participants came to the sessions in formal attire. In rural Bengal, 271
Hindu men wear “dhoti,” a long white cloth draped around the waist, and Muslim men 272
wear “lungi,” a piece of checkered cloth also worn around the waist. Hindu women wear 273
“saris,” as well as “bindi” on their forehead, while Muslim women wear “salwar” and 274
“kamiz” and no “bindi”. However, since there were typically 15 to 20 participants on 275
either side of the room, it was impossible for participants to know who their counterpart 276
was in each game, therefore preserving the anonymity of decisions – this was important 277
since 83% of participants stated in the post-experimental questionnaire that they 278
recognized most of the participants in the room. 279
In the H-H and M-M sessions, all subjects in the room shared the same religion, so 280
the seating arrangement was irrelevant. In the H-M sessions, Hindu subjects were all 281
seated in one end of the room, while Muslim subjects sat in the other end; finally, in the 282
MIX sessions, the experimenter team randomly allocated Hindu and Muslim subjects to 283
either end of the room, subject to the constraint that an equal number of Hindu and 284
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Muslim subjects sat on either end of the room. 285
Sessions were split in three parts. In the first part, participants played three games: 286
the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt game and the Tullock contest (in that specific 287
order). In the second part of the session, participants played a series of individual 288
decision-making tasks — the data from the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt game is 289
the focus of a companion paper, [36]. In the third part, participants individually 290
responded to a questionnaire in a separate room, got feedback on the decisions made in 291
the experiment, and received their corresponding payment. 292
An experimenter standing in the middle of the room read the instructions aloud, 293
using visual aids to explain the incentive structure of each game. We did not employ 294
written instructions since about a third of our subjects was either unable to read or 295
write, or could only write their name. As such, we denoted payoffs in INR and used 296
images of Indian notes and coins to represent payoffs. This enabled these participants to 297
fully understand the incentive structure of the game. See the S1 Appendix for copies of 298
the instruction sets, the visual aids we used as part of explaining the game and decision 299
forms. 300
The instructions explained the Tullock game as follows: subjects were told they 301
would receive INR 80, which they could use to purchase lottery tickets. The lottery 302
tickets would be put in a bag, along with the lottery tickets purchased by the other 303
person they were matched with for that game. One ticket would be randomly drawn 304
and the outcome would determine who would win the INR 80 prize. The actual draw 305
was done at the end of the session for each pair. Each ticket cost INR 10, and subjects 306
could purchase 0, 2, 4, 6 or 8 tickets. The framing of the experiment is consistent with 307
the literature on Tullock contests and it was sufficiently familiar to subjects to allow 308
them to understand the incentive structure. 309
A potential pitfall of running experiments in which subjects do multiple tasks is that 310
there may be contamination of behavior across games, such as order effects, wealth 311
effects, behavioral spillovers or hedging. Order effects are certainly possible in our 312
experiment; while they might affect cooperation or rent-seeking levels, the hypotheses of 313
interest are on differences in behavior across villages and/or treatments, all of which 314
were exposed to the same order of play. We minimized the scope for wealth, spillover 315
and hedging effects in our experiment by (a) not informing subjects of the games they 316
were about to play ahead of time; (b) not providing feedback between games; (c) 317
implementing a turnpike matching scheme, whereby subject i was never matched with 318
the same person twice, and any of i’s matches would never play each other. Subjects 319
were reminded of these features at the start of each game. 320
The first part of the session took approximately 60 minutes and sessions as a whole 321
lasted on average 3 hours. The average payment for the whole session was INR 598.70 322
($9.65). The average daily wage for a rural worker in West Bengal in 2011 ranged from 323
INR 105 ($1.74) for an unskilled female worker to INR 297.50 ($4.93) for a male well 324
digger; in most agricultural occupations average daily wages were approximately INR 325
130 ($2.15), Government of India (2012). 326
2.6 Ethics 327
Given that a substantial proportion of subjects could not read or write, we opted to 328
administer a consent form verbally. Before the start of the session, an experimenter read 329
a statement explaining that subjects’ decisions would be strictly anonymized, that all 330
decisions would be identified only through an ID number, which would not be matched 331
with their name. 332
Subjects were told they were free to leave the session at any time, and that they also 333
had the right to opt out from the study and having their data removed from the study. 334
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Fig 1. Average expenditure levels (measured by purchased tickets) in fragmented
villages by treatment
An English language copy of the verbatim consent text is in S1 Appendix. This study 335
was approved by the University of Exeter Ethics officer (IRB equivalent). 336
Consent was obtained by asking each subject to raise their hand if they objected to 337
participating in the study. Since not all subjects could write, we could not record 338
consent in written form; the experimenter team kept a register of subjects who declined 339
to give their consent. Participants who were unwilling to proceed with the session, 340
either after being read the consent statement, or at any point were free to leave and 341
their data were removed from our database. This procedure was approved by the Ethics 342
Officer overseeing this study. 343
We instructed our recruitment team not to recruit any participants under the age of 344
18. However, two participants reported in the post-experimental survey being 17 years 345
old and another reported being 16 years old. We did not collect any identifying 346
information from participants, including names, addresses, birth dates, or any 347
identification numbers of any kind. 348
3 Results 349
We start by testing Hypothesis 1. Fig 1 displays the average expenditure levels in each 350
of the three conditions for the Hindu and Muslim samples, respectively. In both cases, 351
average effort increases in the probability of being matched with an out-group member, 352
although the differences are not large in absolute value. Furthermore, the 95% 353
confidence intervals suggest some of these differences may not be statistically significant. 354
Table 3 reports results from OLS estimations using the number of tickets purchased by 355
participants as the dependent variable. Our results are robust if we use an ordered Logit 356
estimator to account for the fact that our variable is ordinal and only takes five different 357
values. 358
We break up the results by sub-sample for ease of exposition, although we will 359
consider the pooled data later on for subject pool comparisons. Regression (1) reports 360
the estimation results of the restricted model on the Hindu sample. We find a positive 361
and significant coefficient on H-M (t = 2.39, p = 0.018), though not on MIX 362
(t = 1.51, p = 0.134); the coefficient on MIX is not significantly different to that of H-M 363
(F (1, 164) = 0.17, p = 0.678). Regression (2) reports the estimation results of the 364
restricted model on the Muslim sample. The results are quite different to those in the 365
Muslim sample: no coefficient other than the constant (which relates to the omitted 366
treatment, M-M) is statistically significant, which indicates there are no significant 367
differences in average expenditure between M-M and MIX or H-M. We find no 368
significant differences between H-M and MIX either (F (1, 128) = 0.05, p = 0.832). 369
Regression (3) considers the pooled Muslim and Hindu data, with the relevant 370
interaction dummies, which confirm the analysis of regressions (1) and (2) with regards 371
to treatment effects conditional on subject pool. Regression (4) adds controls at the 372
individual level, such as age, gender, marital status and educational attainment; an 373
attitudinal measure (DisOGi) measuring dislike of people of other religion, as well as a 374
variable capturing the proportion of individuals of the same caste as the decision-maker 375
among the pool of potential matches (i.e. those on the other side of the room), which 376
we collected in the post-experimental survey. The sign and significance of the treatment 377
coefficients on MIX and H-M are unchanged. The only coefficient on the control 378
variables that is statistically significant is the coefficient on SecEdu 379
(t = −1.71, p = 0.087); this is consistent with evidence from [37] on the negative 380
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Hindu Sample Muslim Sample Pooled Data
DV: Ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.37∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.39) (0.30) (1.26)
MIX 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.71
(0.54) (0.63) (0.54) (0.59)
H-M 1.04∗∗ 0.50 1.04∗∗ 0.96∗
(0.44) (0.50) (0.43) (0.53)
M-M 0.48 0.74
(0.50) (0.65)
MIX × Muslim 0.04 0.04
(0.66) (0.75)
H-M × Muslim -0.06 0.02
(0.44) (0.56)
Male -0.50
(0.43)
Married -0.12
(0.41)
Age -0.01
(0.01)
BornHere -0.31
(0.45)
PrimEdu -0.31
(0.47)
SecEdu -0.68∗
(0.39)
TertEdu -1.01
(0.65)
DistHC -0.03
(0.04)
DisOGi 0.62
(0.45)
DisOGi × Muslim 0.21
(0.69)
PropMyCaste 0.57
(0.62)
KnowAll 0.16
(0.41)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06
N 167 131 298 298
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ : p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
Table 3. OLS estimates of the determinants of expenditure in fragmented villages.
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Fig 2. Average expenditure levels (measured by purchased tickets) in H-H and M-M
treatment in fragmented and homogeneous villages
correlation between subjects’ strategic sophistication (here proxied by educational 381
attainment) and overbidding in the Tullock contest. 382
Observation 1: In fragmented villages, Hindu participants spend a higher average 383
amount in the Tullock contest when facing a Muslim participant than when facing a 384
Hindu. We find no such difference among Muslims. 385
We now turn to Hypothesis 2, which pertains to the effect of village composition on 386
in-group biases. Fig 2 displays the average expenditures in the H-H and M-M 387
conditions, varying the type of village where the sessions were conducted. We find, 388
nominally at least, the opposite pattern across the two subject pools: among Hindus, 389
average expenditure is lower in fragmented villages, while the opposite is true for 390
Muslims. However, the absolute level of the difference is quite low: in both comparisons, 391
the difference is around 0.5 tickets; recall that the purchasing unit in the experiment 392
was two tickets. 393
Table 4 presents results from OLS estimates of the determinants of expenditure in 394
H-H and M-M treatments in fragmented and homogeneous villages. We again break up 395
the analysis by religious group, for ease of exposition. Column (1) presents the 396
estimates of the reduced model for the Hindu sample. The constant coefficient, which 397
corresponds to the average expenditure in homogeneous villages is positive and 398
significant (t = 14.20, p < 0.001), while the Fragmented dummy coefficient is negative 399
and significant (t = −2.09, p = 0.038). In other words, average expenditure by Hindus 400
playing other Hindus in fragmented villages is significantly lower than in homogeneous 401
villages. Column (2) presents the estimation results for the constrained model in the 402
Muslim sample. The constant coefficient is positive and significant (t = 8.65, p < 0.001), 403
but the coefficient on Fragmented is not significantly different from zero 404
(t = 1.19, p = 0.236). In other words, there is no significant difference in average 405
expenditure among Muslims playing against other Muslims across village types. Column 406
(3) presents the combined model with a dummy variable for religious group and its 407
interaction with M-M, which replicates the analysis of regressions 1 and 2 on the pooled 408
data. Regression 4 presents the results from the unrestricted model with individual level 409
controls. The coefficient on M-M is no longer significant (t = −1.22, p = 0.222); the only 410
significant coefficient is that on TertEdu (t = −1.89, p = 0.059), again reiterating the 411
earlier finding, this time at the tertiary education level. 412
Observation 2: Average expenditure by Hindu participants in the Tullock contest when 413
playing against fellow in-group members are higher in homogeneous than in fragmented 414
villages. We find no statistically significant difference in expenditure levels across village 415
types among Muslims. 416
We conclude by looking at differences in average expenditure across religious groups 417
in fragmented villages. We would like to clarify that the model we are testing is not one 418
of cultural or religious determinants of behavior in Tullock contests. As such, we do not 419
have any a priori hypothesis to test. Nevertheless, there may be some value in exploring 420
subject pool differences in average behavior conditional on a given treatment, 421
particularly given that the only support for the theoretical predictions we do have 422
comes from only one of the two subject pools. We start by looking at subject pool 423
differences in the treatments conducted in fragmented villages. Column (3) in Table 3 424
presents a dummy interaction model, where a Muslim dummy (= 1 if participant i was 425
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Hindu Sample Muslim Sample Pooled Data
DV: Ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 3.14∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (1.00)
Fragmented -0.77∗∗ 0.57 -0.77∗∗ -0.67∗
(0.37) (0.48) (0.37) (0.40)
M-M -0.86∗∗ -0.58
(0.34) (0.48)
Fragmented × M-M 1.34∗∗ 1.24∗
(0.60) (0.65)
Male -0.47
(0.36)
Married -0.51
(0.39)
Age 0.01
(0.01)
BornHere -0.44
(0.39)
PrimEdu 0.08
(0.46)
SecEdu -0.37
(0.38)
TertEdu -1.07∗
(0.56)
DistHC -0.01
(0.03)
DisOGi 0.15
(0.41)
DisOGi × Muslim -0.55
(0.65)
PropMyCaste 0.17
(0.55)
KnowAll 0.41
(0.40)
R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06
N 193 134 327 326
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ : p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
Table 4. OLS estimates of the determinants of expenditure in in-group/in-group
matches: fragmented vs. homogeneous villages.
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Muslim) is interacted with the H-M and MIX dummies; we also add a dummy for the 426
M-M treatment (which, in this case, is equivalent to having the Muslim dummy). The 427
omitted category is therefore H-H. We do not find any subject pool differences in MIX 428
(MIX × Muslim = 0: t = −0.52, p = 0.601) or in H-M (H-M × Muslim = 0: 429
t = −0.81, p = 0.418). The coefficient on M-M is also non-significant 430
(t = 0.96, p = 0.338), which indicates there was no difference in average expenditures 431
between H-H and M-M. Adding individual controls in column (4) does not change the 432
significance of the subject pool comparisons. Next, we look at subject pool differences 433
in the homogeneous villages. Column (5) in Table 4 shows evidence of subject pool 434
differences in homogeneous villages: the coefficient on M-M is negative and highly 435
significant (t = −2.52, p = 0.012), indicating that Muslims in homogeneous villages 436
playing in-group members spend less on the contest than Hindus in the same type of 437
village. As a robustness check, we can also verify that the same is not true in 438
fragmented villages: (Fragmented × Muslim = Muslim: F (1, 323) = 0.94, p = 0.333). 439
Adding controls makes the difference between H-H and M-M in homogeneous villages no 440
longer significant (t = −1.09, p = 0.277), while the difference between Muslim and 441
Hindus in fragmented villages remains non-significant (F (1, 309) = 1.07, p = 0.302). 442
Observation 3: We find significant level differences in average expenditures between 443
Hindus and Muslims only when participants are playing with fellow in-group members in 444
homogeneous villages. 445
4 Discussion 446
The main finding of our experiment is that the average expenditure by subjects in our 447
experiment appears to be sensitive to the identity of their match, or to the type of 448
village in which they reside only in the case of the Hindu sample. We find relatively 449
small, but statistically significant differences in average expenditure in the Hindu 450
sample when we compare in-group/in-group matches to the treatment where it is 451
certain that subjects will play an out-group; we also find significant differences between 452
behavior in in-group/in-group matches across different village types. We find no 453
significant differences in any treatment comparison in the Muslim sample. 454
We first want to place our results in context by comparing them to the extant 455
literature on Tullock contests. We rule out the possibility that behavior in this 456
experiment was somehow inconsistent with the typical behavior in this class of 457
experiments. Average expenditure levels in our data are above the risk neutral Nash 458
equilibrium, which is consistent with the literature (see [23] for an extensive review). 459
We now discuss the possible reasons why we find small treatment differences in our 460
data. We start with methodological issues. Unlike the overwhelming majority of Tullock 461
experiments, we considered a very coarse action set, in which participants could spend 462
one of five different amounts, including zero. This design decision was made in order to 463
make the game easier to explain to less well-educated participants. From a statistical 464
point of view, the coarse action space could have inflated standard errors compared to 465
the case where the same mean expenditure was drawn from a less coarse set of actions. 466
Also, the coarse action set may have led to “bid compression”, in that for some subjects 467
the optimal expenditure level might have been an intermediate, non-available level of 468
expenditure (e.g. Ei = 3). Since that action was unavailable, subjects may have 469
selected a lower level of expenditure. This in turn could have led to smaller effect sizes. 470
Another possible explanation for a possible bid compression and smaller effect sizes 471
may have been the fact that participants played the Tullock game after having played 472
the Prisoners’ Dilemma. [38] study behavioral spillovers between a linear public goods 473
game and the Tullock contest. They find average expenditure in the Tullock contest is 474
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lower in the treatment where participants play in a parallel public goods game than the 475
treatment where they play the Tullock contest in isolation. However, we still observed a 476
large variation in effort levels across all treatments with 30-50% of all observations being 477
in excess of the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (and strictly dominated strategies), so it is 478
unlikely that bid compression is the primary reason for the absence of treatment effects. 479
A separate possibility is that participants’ strategic sophistication may have played 480
an important role in determining behavior in the Tullock contest. [37] studies the extent 481
to which individual characteristics determine bidding behavior in Tullock contests. He 482
finds that individuals with lower cognitive ability are more prone to overbidding in the 483
Tullock contest, although impulsivity is the main driver of behavior (pp. 19-20). We 484
neither have measures of impulsivity or of cognitive ability; we do have a very crude 485
proxy, which is educational attainment. We find a weakly significant correlation 486
between educational attainment and overbidding, in that participants with secondary 487
and/or tertiary education attainment bid less than illiterate participants. It is possible 488
that, because the Hindu sample is more educated on average — both in our sample as 489
well as in the West Bengal population — we were able to detect significant differences 490
in the Hindu sample but not the Muslim sample. [37] also finds understanding of the 491
experiment is negatively correlated with overbidding; we took care when designing the 492
experimental protocol to ensure that participants understood the rules of the 493
experiment. Further, the notion of a lottery would be quite familiar to participants. 494
In this light, it is interesting to contrast the behavior of our participants in the 495
Tullock contest to their own behavior in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, since when we 496
eliminate strictly dominated strategies from the Tullock contest, both games share the 497
same incentive structure (assuming risk neutrality). In our companion paper, [36], we 498
documented significant differences in cooperation levels in the prisoners’ dilemma as a 499
function of whether subjects play an in-group member or an out-group member, as well 500
as whether subjects reside in a homogeneous or fragmented village. In particular, we 501
found that in religiously-heterogeneous villages, cooperation rates in the Prisoners’ 502
Dilemma were higher in in-group/in-group matches than in in-group/out-group matches. 503
In addition, cooperation rates among in-group matches were significantly lower in 504
homogeneous villages than in fragmented villages. Importantly, the results were largest 505
in the case of the Muslim sample. We do not have a model of cultural differences to 506
which we can resort to explain the sample differences in behavior across the cooperation 507
and competition games we conducted. This is clearly an interesting open research 508
question for the future. 509
[39] find that degree of social fragmentation has no effect on likelihood of civil war if 510
per capita income and growth rates are controlled in the analysis, although controlling 511
for village-level characteristics does not affect the sign of our average treatment effects. 512
In this sense, it is possible that part of our results are driven by unobserved village 513
characteristics, which we could not account for in our design – the test for our second 514
hypothesis relies on a quasi-experimental design, in which village characteristics are 515
taken as given. It is possible that different types of villages developed different norms 516
over the course of generations, and this could prove to be confounded with our 517
identity-saliency hypothesis. However, the same criticism applies to econometric 518
estimation of observational data on conflict. 519
We conclude by comparing our evidence to other studies of identity on conflict. 520
Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo, (2009) show that out-group derogation can also be a 521
powerful driver of behavior. [40] show that subjects make more competitive/spiteful 522
choices when matched with out-group vs. in-group members, and there is evidence from 523
the laboratory suggesting that competitive/spiteful preferences are correlated with 524
higher expenditures in contests [37, 41]. [42] study the extent to which Kenyans exhibit 525
coethnic bias in a series of lab-in-the-field experiments including measures of altruism 526
PLOS 14/18
(dictator game) and cooperation (public goods game). They find no evidence of 527
coethnic bias. [27], who find a significant effect of real ethnic identities on behavior in 528
three-player group Tullock contests. While our ability to draw parallels is limited by the 529
fact that the strategic nature of the two games is slightly different (a group contest has 530
a public good element which is absent in the single player case), there are still 531
important insights to be gain from the comparison. [27] use East Asian students and 532
Caucasian students in a UK university. As [11] argues, the saliency of one’s identity is a 533
matter of context, and it is possible that the manipulation of identity in [27] was more 534
effective in the laboratory setting. In their method, subjects were explicitly told that 535
people in their group were of a particular ethnicity, and all others were of a different 536
ethnicity. In a laboratory setting, most experimental cues are very salient, perhaps more 537
than in the field. That, added to the fact that our religious manipulation was less direct 538
may have resulted in group identities being more salient. This is an important 539
methodological issue which merits further study. 540
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